Rethinking the Nature of the Firm:
The Corporation as a Governance Object
Peer Zumbansen*
“It is important to recognize that most organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals.”1

I. INTRODUCTION
This Article attempts to bridge two discourses—corporate governance and contract governance. Regarding the latter, a group of scholars
has recently set out to develop a more comprehensive research agenda to
explore the governance dimensions of contractual relations, highlighting
the potential of contract theory to develop a more encompassing theory
of social and economic transactions.2 While a renewed interest in the
contribution of economic theory for a concept of contract governance
drives one dimension of this research, another part of this undertaking
has been to move contract theory closer to theories of social organiza*

Professor of Law and Canada Research Chair, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto; PZumbansen@osgoode.yorku.ca. Article presented at the Berle III Symposium, Seattle University School of Law, January 12–14, 2012, with gratitude for the invitation by Charles O’Kelley and
the Berle Center and the opportunity to present these ideas and for intriguing comments from the
conference participants.
This Article is part of evolving work on a theory of corporate governance in the knowledge society. First steps include the following: Peer Zumbansen, The Next “Great Transformation”? The Double Movement in Transnational Corporate Governance and Capital Markets Regulation, in THE
SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF TRANSNATIONAL MARKETS (Christian Joerges & Josef Falke eds.,
2011); Peer Zumbansen, The New Embeddedness of the Corporation: Corporate Social Responsibility in the Knowledge Society, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, LABOUR AND
FINANCIAL CAPITALISM 119 (Cynthia A. Williams & Peer Zumbansen eds., 2011). Parts of the
present Article draw on a presentation at the “Contract Governance” Conference in Berlin in 2010,
convened by Florian Möslein, Karl Riesenhuber and Stefan Grundmann. Thanks to Amar Bhatia,
Tracey Linstead, and Aviv Pichhadze for valuable feedback, to Money Khoromi and Douglas Sarro
for excellent research assistance, as well as to David Konkel and Joan Miller at the Seattle University Law Review for their truly outstanding and succinct editorial work on this paper.
1. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976).
2. CONTRACT GOVERNANCE (Florian Möslein et al. eds., forthcoming 2012); Florian Möslein
& Karl Riesenhuber, Contract Governance – A Research Agenda, 5 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 248 (2009).
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tion. Here, these scholars emphasize the “social” or “public” nature of
contracts to return to a critical reflection on the classical model of oneoff, spot contracts for an exchange of goods or services.3
The inspiration for this enterprise comes from corporate governance
debates over the last two decades. These debates focused on competing
claims of “convergence” versus “divergence” as part of an ambitious
investigation into universal standards, the “end of history,” and the underlying “varieties of capitalism.”4 Meanwhile, the fundamental transformation of the state, which domestically and transnationally forms the
background of the growing prominence of contract as a governance tool,
must be seen as the other dimension of a renewed interest in “governing
contracts.”5
Today, half a decade after a long and expanded debate among corporate lawyers and political economists over the convergence or divergence of corporate governance systems, scholars and courts alike have
moved on to address the pressing regulatory challenges in this field,6 the
contours of which are now just as blurred as the proverbial “nature” of
the business enterprise itself.7 This context provides an excellent opportunity to bring together the “internal” and “external” regulatory perspectives on the corporation. On the “inside,” there is a continuing struggle
between contractual and organizational depictions of the nature of the
firm, while on the “outside,” we see a continuing transformation of a
regulatory framework that is increasingly disembedded from the state.
An approximation of both perspectives allows us to rethink the nature of
the corporation as a subject and an object of governance; the concept of
contract must, however, be expanded in order to contribute to, but not
alone shoulder, an adequate conceptualization of the complex architec-

3. See David Campbell, Reflexivity and Welfarism in the Modern Law of Contract, 20 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 477 (2000); John P. Esser, Institutionalizing Industry: The Changing Forms for
Contract, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 593 (1996).
4. See VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE
ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001) [hereinafter VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM];
Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, in
CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 128–58 (Jeffrey Gordon & Mark
Roe eds., 2004).
5. See generally HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS (1999); PETER VINCENT-JONES,
THE NEW PUBLIC CONTRACTING: REGULATION, RESPONSIVENESS, RELATIONALITY (2006); see also
Peer Zumbansen, The Law of Society: Governance Through Contract, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL.
STUD. 191 (2007).
6. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age, 2 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 1 (2008).
7. Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Walmart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in
Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913 (2007).
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ture of the modern corporation.8 Contract, which cannot be studied in
isolation, occurs within the intersecting modes of governance and, as a
result, provides a crucial element for building a new interdisciplinary
theory of governance.
After a cursory historical sketch of the trajectory of corporate law
theory in Part II, Part III offers contextual evidence for the increased interest among governance and regulation scholars in the area of corporate
law. Against this background, Part IV presents a more detailed discussion and critique of contractual governance in order to challenge the otherwise oversimplifying appropriation of contract to explain complex
power relations within and beyond the corporation. Part V considers the
implications and challenges of the interdisciplinary theoretical analysis
of corporations in the modern context. Part VI briefly concludes.
II. STUDYING THE CORPORATION
Beginning a series of reflections on the nature of the firm today
would require a particular combination of eruditeness and irony that
prompts a more collective, discursive effort than a singular scholarly undertaking. With our deep scepticism of any attempt to conclusively delineate and re-craft a comprehensive theory, each and every element of
this theory remains exposed to further contestation and deconstruction.
Referring to the corporation as an object of study and investigation
through the lenses of theories of the firm, corporate governance, or contract governance opens up—at best—a vista of a historical and intellectual universe that is in every respect overwhelming. And yet, we are
drawn to the corporation, to its beginnings9 and its ends,10 investigating

8. While this Article will sketch the historical and theoretical background and suggest the
outlines of a recontractualized concept of the corporation, a future paper will focus more specifically
on the question of the board’s fiduciary duties. It will suggest that an approximation of contract
theory and corporate governance, with relevant regard to securities regulation, promises insights into
the long-standing challenges that characterize the corporation as a contractual organization. A second future paper will further elaborate the contention made here that stakeholder interests can be
advanced by reformulating the corporate contract—arguably establishing a principal-agent relationship between shareholders and management—as a public contract. In taking issue with two recent
Canadian Supreme Court rulings involving large-scale corporate change of control transactions,
Peoples Dep’t Stores, Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 (Can.) and BCE, Inc. v. 1976
Debentureholders, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 (Can.), the follow-up paper will explore the (partially lost)
opportunity of crafting a more adequate theory of the firm by moving beyond the Court’s interest in
“interests” and its formula of the “good corporate citizen.” Centrally, that paper will draw on relational contract theory and legal pluralism on the one hand and on “social norms” and evolutionary
theory on the other to argue for a systemic approach to corporate governance, allowing us to take a
fresh look at directors’ duties and corporate social responsibility.
9. See, e.g., WALTHER RATHENAU, VOM AKTIENWESEN [OF THE NATURE OF STOCK
CORPORATIONS] 11 (1918):
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them as complex relationships between individual and collective instantiations of power,11 as intricate spheres of organizational design,12 as carriers of “public purpose,”13 as sources of knowledge production and
transformation,14 as demarcations of social spheres and spaces,15 and as
illustrations of the tension between markets and hierarchies16 or between
different “stakeholders.”17 Seen from this vista, corporations offer opporThrough its path from the family enterprise and association to the large corporation there
has occurred a substitution of the foundation of our business associations, their organs
and forms of governance and administration; but neither science, legislature nor judiciary
have taken notice of this inner morphing of the grounds of being and of the forms of impact; alone a series of ever recurring conflicts, taken as contingent or arbitrary, have penetrated public opinion . . . . The administration of a large corporation exceeds—as concerns scope, personnel structure and impetuous shift of tasks—the government of a small
state today or that of a large one of one hundred years ago. I would not know of a time
nor a place on earth, including America, where year in, year out with the same velocity,
security and responsibility a similar daily stock of executionary and administrative work
of constructive nature would have been accomplished as is the case in the governing
echelons of our large corporations.
Id. (Peer Zumbansen trans.). But see ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 309 (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932) (“[I]t involves a
concentration of power in the economic field comparable to the concentration of religious power in
the mediaeval church or of political power in the national state.”).
10. See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF
CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975); see also Dalia Tsuk-Mitchell, The End of Corporate Law, 44 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 703, 729 (2009) (“Having helped to eradicate any meaningful force out of corporate
law, all that the Delaware courts have left to elaborate at the turn of the twenty-first century are
ideals they are unwilling to enforce.”).
11. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 15 (1954).
12. See, e.g., Eric Orts, The Future of Enterprise Organization, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1947 (1998).
13. Charlotte Villiers, Corporate Law, Corporate Power and Corporate Social Responsibility,
in PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 85 (Nina Boeger, Rachel Murray & Charlotte Villiers eds., 2008); Peter Cornelius & Bruce Kogut, Creating the Responsible Firm: In Search
for a New Corporate Governance Paradigm, 4 GERMAN L.J. 45 (2003); Simon Deakin, Squaring the
Circle? Shareholder Value and Corporate Social Responsibility in the UK, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
976 (2002).
14. Cristiano Antonelli, The Evolution of the Industrial Organisation of the Production of
Knowledge, 23 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 243 (1999); Mary O’Sullivan, The Innovative Enterprise and
Corporate Governance, 24 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 393 (2000).
15. Marina Welker, Damani J. Partridge & Rebecca Hardin, Corporate Lives: New Perspectives on the Social Life of the Corporate Form: An Introduction to Supplement 3, 52 CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY S3 (2011). “[U]nderstanding corporations as social forms, actors embedded in
complex relations, and entities that produce and undergo transformation, with all the friction that
entails.” Id. at S4 (citation omitted).
16. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J.
ECON. LIT. 1537 (1981). For a critique, see GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM
127–31 (Anne Bankowska & Ruth Adler trans., 1993).
17. See Simon Deakin, Workers, Finance and Democracy, in THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW:
LIBER AMICORUM BOB HEPPLE QC 79 (Catherine Barnard et al. eds., 2003); Sanford M. Jacoby,
Labor and Finance in the United States, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
LABOUR, AND FINANCE CAPITALISM 277 (Cynthia A. Williams & Peer Zumbansen eds., 2011)
[hereinafter THE EMBEDDED FIRM].
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tunities to study governance structures, whether or not we still think they
can be demarcated along the boundaries between an “inside” and an
“outside.”18
The following observations are inspired by the evolution of the corporation as a focus of investigation among legal scholars, economists,
sociologists, political scientists, historians, and anthropologists demonstrating that the corporation, as an academic subject, has long ceased to
belong to legal scholars alone. It is perhaps only a little less trite to observe that the same is true for the field of corporate law itself. Theory
and practice of the field suggest that we must approach and understand
corporate law not only as a point of conflict between allegedly diametrically opposed “theories of the firm” or between shareholder and stakeholder conceptions, but also as a vibrant, multilayered regulatory regime.
A regime characterized by overlapping, intervening, and conditioning
authorities, nontraditional rule-makers, mixed norms, and new, not exclusively state-based, enforcement and compliance mechanisms.
The present Article, then, is informed by an interest in corporate
governance, broadly understood. Such studies today are of an unavoidably interdisciplinary nature, given the multifaceted nature of the corporation and the resulting concert of interpreting and analyzing disciplines
that rally around the subject. At the same time, corporate lawyers must
confront a mix of relatively concrete challenges that arise from the governance and operation of the corporation and larger considerations regarding the societal status, nature, or responsibility of the corporation.
The answers to these questions have, over time, contributed to a considerable differentiation and deepening of the field, making the corporation
an objet trouvé of a very particular kind. In other words, the corporation
has long been in the center of research that analyzes the governance
framework and architecture of the corporation, the nature and pressures
of different interests in and around the corporation, as well as its larger
place and role in society.
In more than one way, the current “open-mindedness” of corporate
law as an intellectual and interdisciplinary undertaking bears some resemblance to an earlier period in history roughly a century ago. At that
time, legal scholars’ work on the corporation displayed a heightened degree of sensitivity to the interplay between the internal governance di18. Rejecting the boundary, see Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 311, and Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Infrastructure and the New Economy, 8 J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 1, 8 (2011)
(“Fast-paced, global, niche-driven, and increasingly network- rather than firm-based, the economy
today is poorly served by legal markets and institutions developed to meet the demands generated by
an economy based on standardized mass-market manufacturing, predominantly domestic, markets,
and production organized within rather than across firm boundaries.”).
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mensions of the corporation and the evolving normative infrastructure of
corporate or company law in relation to a fast-unfolding market society.19
Both legal scholars and economists undertook parallel and increasingly
discursive and collaborative endeavors, fuelling research on the corporation and its place in a politically and economically volatile environment.20 This path of scholarship reignited in intensified fashion in the
1970s and ’80s.
Meanwhile, and in contrast to much debate around the growing role
of corporations on the national and global scale21 from political, historical, and sociological perspectives, the “law and economics” movement
spread like “prairie fire” through corporate law academia and law
schools in general.22 Next came a period of greater interest among corporate lawyers in market structures, this time allowing for a closer exchange between theoretical models and “real world” evidence from vibrant and integrating markets.23 In the shadow of the experience of the
takeover-frenzied 1980s,24 the “Roaring Nineties,”25 and the burgeoning
exuberance of the “new economy” before its fall,26 corporate governance
as a field for lawyers, economists, and comparative political economists
emerged as a truly global research and policy area.27 At a time when

19. See ERNST FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS (1897); FRANZ KLEIN, DIE
NEUEREN ENTWICKLUNGEN IN VERFASSUNG UND RECHT DER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT [NEW
DEVELOPMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND LAW OF THE STOCK CORPORATION] (1904); FRITZ
NAPHTALI, WIRTSCHAFTSDEMOKRATIE: IHR WESEN, WEG UND ZIEL [ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY: ITS
NATURE, PATH AND GOAL] (1928).
20. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 9; ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW (1986); MARK J.
ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE
FINANCE (1994); Erich Schanze, Potential and Limits of Economic Analysis: The Constitution of the
Firm, in CONTRACT AND ORGANISATION: LEGAL ANALYSIS IN THE LIGHT OF ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL THEORY 204 (Terence Daintith & Gunther Teubner eds., 1986) [hereinafter CONTRACT AND
ORGANISATION]; THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (1904); Arman A.
Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 52 AM.
ECON. R. 777 (1972); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1.
21. Then: JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967); now: NAOMI
KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM (2007).
22. See Brian R. Cheffins, The Trajectory of (Corporate) Law Scholarship, 63 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 456 (2004).
23. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing
the European Corporate Governance Environment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 161 (1992).
24. See Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and Regulation, 9 YALE J.
ON REG. 119 (1992).
25. See JOSEPH STIGLITZ, THE ROARING NINETIES: SEEDS OF DESTRUCTION (2003).
26. See DOUG HENWOOD, AFTER THE NEW ECONOMY: THE BINGE . . . AND THE HANGOVER
THAT WON’T GO AWAY (2003); Ugo Pagano & Maria Alessandra Rossi, The Crash of the
Knowledge Economy, 33 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 665 (2009).
27. For a brilliant overview and analysis of the field, see John W. Cioffi, State of the Art: A
Review Essay on Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research,
48 AM. J. COMP. L. 501 (2000).
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starting associates in New York, Frankfurt, or Paris were paid premium
salaries to work on the mergers and acquisitions boom,28 legal scholars
were touring the global conference circuit to propagate29 or to debate, as
the case might have been, the triumph of converging corporate governance systems.30 The ensuing two decades of corporate governance research were particularly vibrant, as legal scholars, economists, sociologists, and political economists unpacked the distinctions in the historical
and socio-economic-political trajectories of different corporate law regimes.31 Then came Enron.32
This collapse confronted corporate governance research with a
freshly amplified “public” interest in the corporation and its regulation
not least because accounting practices, interlocked corporate entities, and
executive compensation had became widely visible newspaper headlines.
Corporate governance research overall proliferated. Inspired by comparative legal analysis33 and by interdisciplinary research on the “varieties of
capitalism,” a growing number of corporate governance scholars have
routinely been collaborating from their home bases in law, management
studies, corporate social responsibility (CSR), or organizational psychol28. But see the situation today. Roben Farzad, Law Firms Trim Their Ranks to Boost Profits,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11
_19/b4227016790130.htm.
29. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439 (2001); see also Henry Hansmann, How Close is the End of History?, 31 J. CORP. L.
745 (2006).
30. For insightful assessments, see Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of
“Global” Convergence in Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 321 (2001); Ronald Dore,
William Lazonick & Mary O’Sullivan, Varieties of Capitalism in the Twentieth Century, 15 OXFORD
REV. ECON. POL’Y 102 (1999). And with further differentiation, see Ruth V. Aguilera, Kurt A.
Desender & Luiz Ricardo Kabbach de Castro, A Bundle Perspective to Comparative Corporate
Governance, in SAGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 379, 391 (Thomas Clarke &
Douglas Branson eds., 2011).
31. See JOHN W. CIOFFI, PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE POWER: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN AN AGE OF FINANCE CAPITALISM (2010); David
Soskice, Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the
1980’s and 1990’s, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM 101 (Herbert
Kitschelt et al. eds., 1999); Sigurt Vitols, Varieties of Corporate Governance: Comparing Germany
and the UK, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM, supra note 4, at 337; John W. Cioffi, Governing Globalization? The State, Law, and Structural Change in Corporate Governance, 27 J.L. & SOC’Y 572
(2000); William Lazonick, Varieties of Capitalism and Innovative Enterprise, 24 COMP. SOC. RES.
21 (2007).
32. See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV.
1275 (2002); Simon Deakin & Suzanne J. Konzelmann, Learning from Enron, 12 CORP.
GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 134 (2004).
33. For a selection of the positions, see CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, supra note 4, at 128–58; see also Klaus Jürgen Hopt, Comparative Company Law, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1161 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006); David C. Donald, Approaching Comparative Company Law, 14 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 83 (2008).
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ogy.34 These scholars regularly second-guess the extremely influential
assertions put forward by a group of scholars who had relied on empirical studies to ascertain a strong correlation between legal origins, ownership structures, and shareholder rights.35 Scholars in Europe and in North
America challenged these findings on various fronts and contributed to
an altogether much more differentiated picture of corporate governance
regulation.36
Concurrently, scholars began studying the corporation and its regulatory infrastructure from yet another perspective. Their primary interest
is in the corporation as a hybrid entity, caught between being a subject
and an object of rule-making.37 This ambivalent nature of the corporation
lends itself perfectly to what has, in our day, become a multipronged investigation into the evolving nature of the corporation, as it appears on
both sides of its artificially constructed boundaries.38 On the “inside,”
scholars have worked hard to lay bare what makes the corporation “tick”
so that we may best understand, shape, and influence the roles played by
various members of the corporate organization.39 On the corporation’s
“outside,” the picture is just as perplexing: in light of the indisputable
fact that the corporation remains the dominant force in a globally inte-

34. A fitting illustration is given in Ruth Aguilera, Deborah Rupp, Cynthia A. Williams & Jyoti
Ganapathi, Putting the S Back in Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multi-Level Theory of Social
Change in Organizations, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 836 (2004).
35. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 285 (2008); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,
Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Andrei
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997).
36. Ruth V. Aguilera & Cynthia A. Williams, “Law and Finance”: Inaccurate, Incomplete,
and Important, 2009 BYU L. REV.1413; Mathias M. Siems & Simon Deakin, Comparative Law and
Finance: Past, Present and Future Research, 166 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 120
(2010); Holger Spamann, Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal Families and the Diffusion of
(Corporate) Law, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1813.
37. See, e.g., Michael Power, Constructing the Responsible Organization: Accounting and
Environmental Representation, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ECOLOGICAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE
CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF ECOLOGICAL SELF-ORGANIZATION 369 (Gunther Teubner et al. eds.,
1994); TEUBNER, supra note 16, at 123−58.
38. See John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J.
655 (1926).
39. See, e.g., MICHEL CROZIER, L’ENTREPRISE A L’ECOUTE: APPRENDRE LE MANAGEMENT
POST-INDUSTRIEL [THE ENTERPRISE UNDER SCRUTINY: LEARNING POST-INDUSTRIAL
MANAGEMENT] (Seuil 1994) (1989); JAMES E. POST, LEE E. PRESTON & SYBILLE SACHS,
REDEFINING THE CORPORATION: STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL WEALTH
(2002); JOHN ROBERTS, THE MODERN FIRM: ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN FOR PERFORMANCE AND
GROWTH (2004); Marjolijn S. Dijksterhuis, Frans A. J. Van den Bosch & Henk W. Volberda, Where
Do New Organizational Forms Come From? Management Logics as a Source of Coevolution, 10
ORG. SCI. 569 (1999); Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of
the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002).
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grated economy,40 scholars have increasingly directed their attention at
the complex regulatory and normative landscape in which the corporation operates. These studies41 coalesce to sketch a detailed map of the
interplay between the “hard” and “soft,” “public” and “private” norms
that shape corporate activities.42
On the following pages, we gaze inward toward the “inner” life of
the corporation. The goal of this reorientation is to take a closer look at
the interaction between two theoretical constructs in the assessment of
the corporation. One—corporate governance—is merely another framework through which scholars have been studying the organizational design and power structure of the modern business corporation for some
time.43 The other is concerned with contract governance and aims at approximating an already highly differentiated body of work on and around
contract law to the research done under the corporate governance umbrella. The hope is that a parallel view and border-crossing engagement
with both approaches can unlock some of the deadlocks that are inherent
to each. In order to more fully understand the upsides (and downsides) of
contract thinking regarding the corporation, it will be helpful to contextualize the present interest in contract governance against the background
of a fundamental transformation of the regulatory state, which gives rise
to unfolding processes of decentralization, privatization, and to institutional and normative pluralism.44 These processes raise significant questions with regard to law as a tool of societal governance, and it is to these
questions that the article now turns.

40. See Detlev F. Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational
Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 739 (1970).
41. See, e.g., SUMMARY REPORT: EXPERT MEETING ON CORPORATE LAW AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES OF USING CORPORATE LAW TO ENCOURAGE
CORPORATIONS TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY
GENERAL [SRSG] CORPORATE LAW TOOLS PROJECT (2010), available at http://www.valoresoc
iale.it/detail.asp?c=1&p=0&id=316; David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Human Rights Responsibilities of Business as Non-State Actors, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 315 (Philip Alston ed., 2005); David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human
Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931 (2004); Gunther Teubner, Self-Constitutionalizing TNCs? On the Linkage of “Private” and “Public” Corporate
Codes of Conduct, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 617 (2011).
42. See Peer Zumbansen, Neither ‘Public’ nor ‘Private,’ ‘National’ nor ‘International’:
Transnational Corporate Governance from a Legal Pluralist Perspective, 38 J.L. & SOC’Y 50
(2011).
43. See Mark J. Roe, Comparative Corporate Governance, in THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 339–46 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY].
44. For a concise analysis, see Colin Scott, Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of
the Post Regulatory State, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY
REFORMS FOR THE AGE OF GOVERNANCE 145–74 (Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur eds., 2004).
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III. THE LAWYER’S MINDSET AND THE NEW TWIST IN
LAW AND ECONOMICS
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. notes toward the end of his landmark
essay, The Path of the Law, that “[w]e cannot all be Descartes or Kant,
but we all want happiness.”45 As students of this text once knew, he continues to remark:
And happiness, I am sure from having known many successful men,
cannot be won simply by being counsel for great corporations and
having an income of fifty thousand dollars. An intellect great
enough to win the prize needs other food beside success. The remoter and more general aspects of the law are those which give it
universal interest. It is through them that you not only become a
great master in your calling, but connect your subject with the universe and catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law.46

There is much in these lines to ponder. Holmes’s essay, throughout,
reads—and was meant—as a wholehearted assault on dearly held beliefs
regarding the objective nature of abstract legal principles, the separation
of law and morality, and the construction of legal rules in following the
command of logic. Heralded—by none other than one of the founding
fathers of law and economics and one of the great, innovative, and continuously surprising legal minds of our day47—as a prophecy coming
true,48 Holmes’s essay placed a great number of the core treats of the
coming legal evolution before his readers’ eyes—over 110 years ago.
Where Holmes pointed to the rising significance of science and
economics for the theory and practice of law,49 the ensuing legal evolu-

45. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 478 (1897) [hereinafter Holmes, The Path of the Law]; see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, On Receiving the Degree of Doctor of Laws, Yale University Commencement (June 30, 1886), in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 33 (1920) (“The power of honor to bind men’s lives is not less now than it was in the Middle
Ages. Now as then it is the breath of our nostrils; it is that for which we live, for which, if need be,
we are willing to die. It is that which makes the man whose gift is the power to gain riches sacrifice
health and even life to the pursuit. It is that which makes the scholar feel that he cannot afford to be
rich.”).
46. Holmes, The Path of the Law, supra note 45.
47. “And suppose no corporation had ever been punished for violating customary international
law. There is always a first time for litigation to enforce a norm; there has to be.” Flomo v. Firestone
Nat’l Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011).
48. Richard A. Posner, The Path Away from the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1039, 1043 (1997).
49. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS, supra note 45, at 210:
A hundred years ago men explained any part of the universe by showing its fitness for
certain ends, and demonstrating what they conceived to be its final cause according to a
providential scheme. In our less theological and more scientific day, we explain an object
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tion proved him right. What sets the present apart from the past, however, is that precisely this transformation of legal science into its presentday conundrical mixture of legal theory and philosophy, regulatory theory or “governance,”50 and economic theory51 not only goes beyond the
initially sketched parameters but also fundamentally undermines a view
that would conceive of law as of a field and its neighbor disciplines.52
“The centre cannot hold”53—law’s autonomous status within a densely
structured context of social order theories is undermined, already by
Holmes himself, by exposing it to a complex set of questions touching on
the nature, function, and form of law. These questions eventually challenge the boundaries between law and non-law. And this precisely
proved to be the aftermath and legacy of Holmes’s and his colleagues’
anti-formalist attack: a powerful engagement with the assumptions, theories, and policies of legal argument.54
This context provides promising, if not intimidating, entry points
for law’s engagement with itself and all that it might, and might not, be.
Lawyers like Holmes were well-aware of the vulnerability of the edifice
of norms, court rooms, and law school curricula long before the advent
of globalization, the much lamented exhaustion of the state’s regulatory
capacities,55 and the legal system’s increased generation of “regulatory
laws,” which due to their complex nature raise particular compliance
challenges.56 With this in mind, we must remain aware of the continuousby tracing the order and process of its growth and development from a starting point assumed as given.
50. Arguably, the new paradigm in administrative sciences. See, e.g., PHILIPPE MOREAU
DEFARGES, LA GOUVERNANCE [GOVERNANCE] (2008); Claudio Franzius, Governance und
Regelungsstrukturen, 97 VERWALTUNGSARCHIV [ADMINISTRATIVE ARCHIVE] 186 (2006); Oliver E.
Williamson, The Economics of Governance, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (2005). For a paradigm adopted
on both the national and the global level, see THOMAS HALE & DAVID HELD, HANDBOOK OF
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE (2011); HELMUT WILLKE, SMART GOVERNANCE: GOVERNING THE
GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY (2007); Fleur E. Johns, Global Governance: An Heretical History
Play, 4 GLOBAL JURIST ADVANCES Art. 3 (2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=603232; and
Peer Zumbansen, Governance: An Interdisciplinary Perspective, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON
GOVERNANCE (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012).
51. See John Oberdiek, Philosophical Issues in Tort Law, 3 PHILOSOPHY COMPASS 734 (2008);
Oliver Williamson, The Lens of Contract: Private Ordering, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 438 (2002).
52. See, e.g., DIETER GRIMM, RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT UND NACHBARWISSENSCHAFTEN [LAW
AND NEIGHBORING SCIENCES] (1976).
53. William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming (1920).
54. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (1975);
Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809
(1935); Roscoe Pound, The Call for a “Realist” Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931); Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910).
55. See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (Oceana
Publ’ns 1950) (1930).
56. See Kristin E. Hickman & Claire A. Hill, Concepts, Categories, and Compliance in the
Regulatory State, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1151, 1159–74 (2010). “[R]egulatory laws tend to differ from
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ly mounted challenges of law’s empire, as they are promulgated by
economists,57 sociologists,58 geographers,59 or anthropologists,60 just to
name a few of the disciplines with a keen interest in law as a governance
tool.61 To reflect on the origins of interdisciplinary thinking of and
around law, as it pertains to the corporation, is especially crucial at a
time when scientific advances propel a rapidly growing knowledge base
concerning just about anything connected to legal reasoning. This
knowledge environment creates the potential for the ubiquitous excitement about a new “Law and . . . ,”62 having an almost overwhelming effect on us regarding an awareness and appreciation of much older engagements with law’s interdisciplinary foundations.
The current interest in law’s psychological63 and behavioral economic64 dimensions gives the indisputable triumph of law and economics
over other law and society movements yet another twist. This triumph
implicates important consequences for our understanding of the
embeddedness of law in a rich context of theoretical and empirical studies of human—individual and collective65—and institutional behavior.66
The dialogue between economics, sociology,67 and evolutionary theory68
other types of law in the complexity of both their subject matter and the programs they establish.” Id.
at 1174.
57. See AVINASH K. DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE MODES OF
GOVERNANCE (2004).
58. See Saskia Sassen, The State and Economic Globalization: Any Implications for International Law?, 1 U. CHI. J. INT’L L. 109 (2000).
59. See David Harvey, The Sociological and Geographical Imaginations, 18 INT’L J. POL.,
CULTURE & SOC’Y 211 (2005).
60. See Sally Engle Merry, Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Governance, 52 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S83 (2011).
61. For a discussion, see Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking
on the Technicalities, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 973 (2005); see also Peer Zumbansen, Governance: An
Interdisciplinary Perspective, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON GOVERNANCE, supra note 50.
62. See, e.g., the scholars and related specialized programs ranging from Law and Psychology,
http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/degrees/joint/psychology/; Law and Geography, http://www
.sfu.ca/~blomley/research.html; Law and Biology, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/22
16; Law and Ethics, http://www.trinity.utoronto.ca/Current_Students/esl.htm; to Law and Science,
http://web.mit.edu/~ssilbey/www/pdf/Silbey_I_fnl.pdf.
63. See, e.g., the brilliant work by Ruth Aguilera and others, supra notes 34 and 36.
64. See BEHAVIOURAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
65. See LAW AND HAPPINESS (Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein eds., 2010).
66. See Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian & Francesco Trebbit, Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development, 9 J. ECON. GROWTH
131 (2004); see also DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990).
67. See, e.g., DIRK BAECKER, WIRTSCHAFTSSOZIOLOGIE [ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY] (2006);
Victor Nee & Richard Swedberg, Economic Sociology and New Institutional Economics, in
HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 789 (Claude Ménard & Mary Shirley eds., 2005).
68. See RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF
ECONOMIC CHANGE (1985); Peer Zumbansen & Gralf-Peter Calliess, Law, Economics, and Evolu-
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has considerable roots, giving rise to a number of very promising research avenues, altogether fostering a more expansive and interdisciplinary interest in norm-creation69 and societal ordering.70 Building on, but
going beyond the Legal Realists’ attack of the impenetrable judicial
mindset,71 law and psychology scholars and behavioral economists have
more recently taken toward a better understanding of the motivational
forces behind legal and wider social decision-making.72
What insights should we as corporate law scholars, and as legal
scholars more generally, begin to draw from these suggestions? In order
to begin to unpack the interdisciplinary promise for a better understanding of law today, the picture needs to be more accentuated. Lawyers in
different areas such as, but not limited to, criminal law, tort law, constitutional law, and international law73 have long been addressing structures
and effects of (for example) collective human behavior. At the basis of
such engagement has been the recognition that the attribution of different
legally scrutinizable forms of guilt, responsibility, accountability, or—in
international law—authority74 requires a particular legal theoretical effort
to address incomplete or inchoate chains of causation. Early on, lawyers
recognized that in order to make sense of the intertwined nature of individual and collective behavior either in extreme circumstances75 or in
organizational corporate contexts,76 they would have to expand traditional legal categories.
Additionally, the work in organizational psychology and behavioral
economics, which scholars have brought to bear on corporate governance
with increasing intensity,77 has a number of further applications that detionary Theory: State of the Art and Interdisciplinary Perspectives, LAW, ECONOMICS AND
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 1 (Peer Zumbansen & Gralf-Peter Calliess eds., 2011).
69. See NORMS AND THE LAW (John N. Drobak ed., 2006); Richard A. Posner, Social Norms,
Social Meaning, and Economic Analysis of Law: A Comment, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 553 (1998); Cass
R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
70. See Elinor Ostrom, Challenges and Growth: The Development of the Interdisciplinary
Field of Institutional Analysis, 3 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 239 (2007).
71. See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
72. E.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE. IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
73. E.g., Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law and Social Movements: Challenges of
Theorizing Resistance, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 397 (2003).
74. See Christoph Schreuer, The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for
International Law?, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 447 (1993).
75. See CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING, ORDINARY MEN: RESERVE POLICE BATTALION 101 AND
THE FINAL SOLUTION IN POLAND (1992).
76. See Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. Ltd. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662 (Can.).
77. See, e.g., CHESTER BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE (1938); CHESTER
BARNARD, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION (1982); THOMAS DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS AND MORALITY (1982); HERBERT
SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (1947); Aguilera, Rupp, Williams & Ganapathi, supra note 34;
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serve our attention. The applications become apparent when we return to
the earlier projects undertaken primarily by law and society scholars with
the aim of rendering a more complete picture of the embeddedness of
legal regulation in heterogeneous normative and institutional settings.
Groundbreaking work in that regard was carried out, for example, in the
area of contract law.78 Lawyers,79 legal pluralists,80 and sociologists81
were among those who pointed to the myriad forms in which informal
norms governed behavior in far more subtle and sophisticated ways than
a formalistic legal model would imply. Standing on the shoulders of legal-sociological scholars who explored the interaction between formal
and informal order systems,82 legal theorists were able to draw an impressively more layered and differentiated picture of “contracts in action.”83
These evolutionary steps are important to keep in mind today when
we learn that a new breed of “social norms theorists” harbor deep scepticism vis-à-vis allegedly incompetent or overzealous judges who adjudicate complex contractual arrangements.84 In fact, serious attempts to
make sense of the formal/informal regulatory environment, which characterized, shaped, and informed contractual governance, had been undertaken. And such attempts had not only been based on extensive empirical
research but also had been carried out with particular scrutiny of the economic dimensions of these regulatory patterns.85 Research on these fronts
resulted in, among other insights, a growing awareness of the layers of
contractual bargaining that could not fully be explained by reference to
Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead
Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997).
78. See Stewart Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of Contract, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 507 (1977).
79. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
80. See Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 719 (1973).
81. See Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360 (1973).
82. See EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (Russell &
Russell 1962) (originally published in German as GRUNDLEGUNG DER SOZIOLOGIE DES RECHTS in
1913); GEORGES GURVITCH, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (Routledge and Kegan Paul 1947) (originally
published in French as PROBLÈMES DE LA SOCIOLOGIE DU DROIT).
83. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963). For further discussion, see the landmark casebook by STEWART
MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION (1995).
84. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 156 (2000); Robert E. Scott, The Death of
Contract Law, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 369 (2004).
85. See, e.g., David Campbell, The Incompleteness of our Understanding of the Law and Economics of Relational Contract, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 645; Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of
Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72
NW. U. L. REV. 854 (1978); Zumbansen, supra note 5.
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either the (subjective) will of the parties or to an established (objective)
purpose dimension of the arrangement. Instead, an economic sociology
and empirical legal studies approach taken to the scrutiny of contractual
arrangements revealed both long-term86 as well as organizational87 dimensions that prompted a fundamental reconsideration of the confines of
a contractual agreement.88 This shift in perspective eventually gave way
to an increasingly differentiated understanding of the adaptive and, arguably, constitutionalizing dimensions of contract.89
IV. THE PROMISES (AND PITFALLS) OF CONTRACT GOVERNANCE
Today, the “materialization of contract law”90 has a sour ring to it
because even stern adepts of consumer protection law have grown aware
of the intricacies of judicial engagements with fast-evolving, sensible
areas of social organization.91 In response, contract theorists have begun
to turn their curious minds to an even more layered analysis of contractual governance, both with regard to a political critique of power relations92
and a better understanding of contractual networks.93
These developments are crucial elements in the formation of a new
regulatory landscape, which can be described neither with reference to
the state as sole law-producer nor with reference alone to legal rules

86. Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and What We Do Not Know, 1985 WIS.
L. REV. 483.
87. CONTRACT AND ORGANISATION, supra note 20.
88. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning
of Consent, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 189 (Omri Ben-Shahar
ed., 2007).
89. See Rudolf Wiethölter, Privatrecht als Gesellschaftstheorie?[Private Law as Theory of
Society?], in FUNKTIONSWANDEL DER PRIVATRECHTSINSTITUTIONEN [TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FUNCTIONS OF PRIVATE LAW INSTITUTIONS] 645 (Fritz Baur et al. eds., 1974); see also Karl Llewellyn, What Price Contract? An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704 (1930).
90. See KARL RENNER, THE INSTITUTIONS OF PRIVATE LAW AND THEIR SOCIAL FUNCTIONS
(Agnes Schwarzschild trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul 1949) (1929); MAX WEBER, ON LAW IN
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Max Rheinstein ed., Max Rheinstein & Edward Shils trans., 1967); FRANZ
WIEACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT UNTER BESONDERER BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG
DER DEUTSCHEN ENTWICKLUNG [A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE WITH PARTICULAR
REFERENCE TO GERMANY] (1967).
91. See REINHARD DAMM, Privatautonomie und Verbraucherschutz, Legalstruktur und
Realstruktur von Autonomiekonzepten [Private Autonomy and Consumer Protection: Legal and Real
Structure of Concepts of Autonomy], 50 VERSICHERUNGSRECHT [INSURANCE LAW] 129 (1999).
92. See Roy Kreitner, Frameworks of Cooperation: Competing, Conflicting, and Joined Interests in Contract and its Surroundings, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 59 (2005).
93. See Marc Amstutz, The Constitution of Contractual Networks, in NETWORKS: LEGAL
ISSUES OF MULTILATERAL CO-OPERATION 309 (Marc Amstutz & Gunther Teubner eds., 2009);
GUNTHER TEUBNER, NETWORKS AS CONNECTED CONTRACTS (Hugh Collins ed., 2011); Stefan
Grundmann, Die Dogmatik der Vertragsnetze [The Legal Dogmatics of Contractual Networks], 207
ARCHIV FÜR DIE CILIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS [ARCHIVE OF CIVIL LAW PRACTICE] 718 (2007).
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when we attempt to depict present and emerging regulatory structures.94
It should be against this background and in light of legal scholars’ attempts to make sense of the legal-sociological, legal-pluralist, and evolutionary theories, as well as prospects of an emerging transnational normative order95 that we continue to posit the project of “contract governance”96 vis-à-vis complementing bodies of theory interested in social
ordering. Scholars addressing a confrontation between legal and nonlegal approaches to contract governance should be mindful of the questionability of law’s boundaries as such—today as in the past. As Holmes
said:
It is perfectly proper to regard and study the law simply as a great
anthropological document. It is proper to resort to it to discover
what ideals of society have been strong enough to reach that final
stage of expression, or what have been the changes in dominant ideals from century to century. It is proper to study it as an exercise in
the morphology and transformation of human ideas. The study pursued for such ends becomes science in the strictest sense.97

Contract governance comes onto the scene with considerable baggage; baggage we need to study closely to unpack the continued prominence that contractarian thinking enjoys in the field of corporate governance. The layered inheritance of contract governance expresses itself in
the triple dimension of contract governance itself, which can mean that
contracts govern, or that we are concerned with the governance of contracts, or with the governance of contracts that govern.98 Traditional law
and economics scholars would likely embrace the governing function of
contracts, while progressive lawyers interested in the materialization of
94. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Towards a Legal Theory of Supranationality – The Viability of the
Network Concept, 3 EUR. L.J. 33 (1997). For a discussion of transnational private law, see GRALFPETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF
TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (2010, Paperback 2012).
95. E.g., Ross Cranston, Theorizing Transnational Commercial Law, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 597
(2007); Clive M. Schmitthoff, International Business Law: A New Law Merchant, 2 CURRENT L. &
SOC. PROBLEMS 129 (1961); see also Wolfgang Kerber, Transnational Commercial Law, Multi-level
Legal Systems and Evolutionary Economics, in LAW, ECONOMICS AND EVOLUTIONARY THEORY,
supra note 68, at 297; Roger Cotterrell, Spectres of Transnationalism: Changing Terrains of Sociology of Law, 36 J.L. & SOC’Y 481 (2009); Cotterrell, What is Transnational Law?, 37 L. & Soc. Inquiry 500 (2012) [with an extensive discussion of CALLIESS & ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS,
note 94]
96. See Riesenhuber & Möslein, supra note 2.
97. HOLMES, supra note 49, at 212.
98. This last dimension connects contract governance and contract theory with what administrative, and more particularly, environmental lawyers have learned to address from the perspective of
regulatory theory. Here, the focus is in particular on reflexive forms of governmental intervention.
See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (1995). For additional
background, see Power, supra note 37.
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law99 would tend to focus on the scope of adjudication and judge-made
contract law, captured in the governance of contracts.100 Contract governance, understood as a conceptual framework, is an ingenious proposition as an intellectual undertaking and as a research enterprise because it
naturally captures both of these dimensions. Because of this capture it is
possible to see the inside and the outside of contract governance, which
illustrates the complex assumptions that go into the project of “contract
governance,” as currently pursued, from the start and explains its promise for a continued depiction of the corporation as a contractual structure.
But what has forcefully been shown in the interpretation of the business
corporation as a nexus of contracts101 can just as aptly be applied to the
idea of contract governance itself. In both corporate governance and in
contract governance, the construction of a complex governance architecture on contract as a self-explanatory and auto-legitimizing principle detaches the contract from its legal-regulatory context by associating it with
a sphere distinct from the state and regulatory “intervention.” Such an
un-ironic rendering of contract governance understood as governance by
contract “invisibilizes” the “basis of contract”102 and hereby continues to
ignore the scathing critique offered by Holmes in 1905.103
This isolating depiction of contract governance as autonomous from
other, allegedly state-based forms of lawmaking and regulatory governance repeats what a number of law and economics scholars have been
arguing regarding the autonomy of so-called “social norms.” Scholars
identify and herald social norms as the glue of highly differentiated,
modern market societies whose complexity renders any attempt by the
state’s regulatory apparatus and the judiciary futile.104
There is, certainly, another reading of the idea of contract governance that depicts it as a comprehensive societal ordering framework.105
This reading would hope to undo the “discovery of social norms by law
and economics” scholars 106 in order to appreciate the concept of contractual governance as part of a comprehensive theory of contract in a liberal

99. RENNER, supra note 90.
100. John N. Adams & Roger Brownsword, The Ideologies of Contract, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 205,
213 (1987).
101. See William W. Bratton, The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989).
102. See Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933).
103. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
104. See POSNER, supra note 84.
105. See Hugh Collins, The Voice of the Community in Private Law Discourse, 3 EUR. L.J. 407
(1997); Zumbansen, supra note 5.
106. Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537
(1998).
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society.107 Pondering the embeddedness of contract governance in a
framework of both institutional and normative reference points ensures
that the connection between society and the practice (and theory) of contracting is never left out of sight. That connection is severed when one
plays contract governance off against the governance of contract, as is
done by social norms theorists and proponents of a neo-formalist approach to contract law.108 In contrast, the genius of contract governance
has always been the recognition that these two dimensions cannot be
separated in a way that one would potentially trump the other. To do so
would render absurd the fact that contracting is part of societal interaction. To recognize contractual governance (as governance through contract) as part of society, however, connects the theory of contract governance with the theory of society. And the latter is far too complex to be
captured in the scrutiny of this or that instance, where courts wandered
into the judicial resolution of complex contractual relationships.
Contract governance cannot be reduced to a theory of social norms
independent from the theory of society in which it is embedded. This
theory, however, is not fully accessible for the law itself, as it has its own
legal rhymes and reasons. But the differentiation of the legal system occurs as the law reacts to the world over time. In doing so, it receives impulses from economics, politics, and religion that perturbate, impregnate,
and challenge the law and its toolkit.
V. COMING FULL CIRCLE? THE CORPORATION AND
CONTRACT GOVERNANCE
For lawyers, taking on economics—either in the way economists
engage with psychology and behavioral sciences or in the way economists continue to push our imagination to better understand the nature of
institutions109 and norms110—can be fruitful. The lawyers’ task highlights
that legal theoretical analysis of corporate governance is a complex enterprise.
The promise lies in connecting social norms theory, new institutional economics, behavioral economics, and evolutionary theory with
the law’s earlier engagement with sociology111 and political theory112 in

107. COLLINS, supra note 5, at 3–4.
108. See Scott, supra note 84.
109. See NORTH, supra note 66; DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF
ECONOMIC CHANGE (2005).
110. For a poignant assessment, see David Charny, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order:
“Norms” in Contractual Relationships, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1841 (1996).
111. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (W. D. Halls trans., Free
Press 1984) (1893); MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT (W. D. Halls trans., 1990); WEBER, supra note 90.
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order to unfold the true potential of a historically evolving interdisciplinary exploration of this area of law and corresponding social, economic,
and political theory. Such “connecting” cannot simply mean to build on
earlier findings by stacking newer trends of “interdisciplinary” studies (à
la ‘law and . . .’) onto new ones.113 Instead, a connection must take into
account the yet-unfulfilled promise of these longstanding endeavors to
deconstruct, unpack, and lay bare the unquestioned assumptions and holisms of theories such as (economic) efficiency,114 market freedom,115 or
theories about “the corporation.”116 This enterprise could potentially have
a further reach but is likely to be complemented by a larger set of challenges arising from the diversity of materials, questions of method, and
avenues of conceptualization than we are accustomed to in the ordinary
law and economics approach to corporate law.117
The remainder of this Article is an attempt to draw on the insights
from the preceding discussions pertaining to corporate governance and
the emerging research into contract governance. Central to the following
undertaking is a revisiting of the scholarship and theory regarding “relational contracting.” In order to assess whether and to what degree relational contract theory might offer helpful insights for an alternative
contractualist theory of the firm, it will be necessary to review once more
the theoretical underpinnings of the contractualist theory of the firm,
which has dominated corporate governance debate over the past decades.
In that regard, the first part of the following section will critically explore
the individualistic assumptions that inform the dominant theory of the
firm. In a second step, it will be necessary to restate the methodological
underpinnings of relational contract theory, before engaging with the
well-known critiques leveled against that theory.

112. See Stewart Macaulay, Private Government, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 445
(Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986).
113. I am grateful to Amar Bhatia (University of Toronto) for having emphasized this point.
114. See Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Reduction as Legitimation, 90 YALE L.J. 1275 (1981).
115. See David Campbell, Breach of Contract and the Efficiency of Markets, in THE LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FREE MARKETS 140 (Stephen F. Copp ed., 2008); Adams & Brownsword, supra
note 100, at 208 (questioning the postulate of a non-interventionist role of courts in market dealings).
116. This task is similarly recognized among anthropologists. “[A]n anthropological effort to
pluralize, relativize, and contextualize corporate forms geographically and historically should participate in an interdisciplinary analytical framework that is actively engaged with the body of substantive empirical work on corporations carried out in other fields.” Welker, Partridge & Hardin, supra
note 15, at S6.
117. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW (1991). For suggestions to widen the hitherto pursued dialogue between economics and corporate law, see Hopt, supra note 33, at 1161.
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A. The Conundrum of Agency in Contemporary Contract
and Corporate Theory
The caveat in order here originates from the implicitly individualistic assumptions that appear to inform some of the current interest in behavioral economics but that also underlie other law and economics approaches—for example, lawyers’ engagement with game theory.118 The
focus on individual or collective (again seen as divisible into separate
actors) behavioral patterns suggests that there is still a widely held belief
in the possibility of tracing results back to choices, regardless of how
irrational these choices might be. Contrast this assumption with the lessons from the financial crisis.
The crisis illustrates the shortcomings of governance and intervention theories that are oriented around linear cause-effect and responsiveness relations between problem and solution.119 Indeed, if we consider
the current research into the origins and causes of the financial crisis, we
find that the analytical regulatory theory toolkits of cause-effect relations
as well as market-state distinctions120 are at odds with the more systemic
roots of the crisis. The consequences of this shift in perspective, however, are still far from clear. But what is emerging is a need to seriously
reflect on regulation as the basis of recognizing complex systemic
boundaries, spheres, and co-dynamics. Then, on the basis that there is a
fundamental inability to fully translate rationalities of one system—law,
economics, politics, religion, etc.—into another, one would more adequately understand how regulatory approaches that aim to universalize
the rationality of one system by imposing them on others are bound to
fail.
This can be illustrated by taking the example of law as a social system: “Legal forms encode information about coordination strategies
which have proved more or less successful in particular social settings,
including the economic domains of the market and the business enterprise.”121 This does not mean that the economic system is able to either
incorporate, let alone understand, this particular approach to the framing
118. See, e.g., Anne van Aaken, Effectuating Public International Law Through Market Mechanisms? 165 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 33 (2009). For a critical discussion of lawyers’ usages of game theory, see Simon Deakin, Legal Evolution: Integrating Economic and Systemic Approaches (Univ. of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 41/2011, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1934738.
119. See the exchange between Erhard Blankenburg, The Poverty of Evolutionism: A Critique
of Teubner’s Case for ‘Reflexive Law’, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 273 (1984), and Gunther Teubner,
Autopoiesis in Law and Society: A Rejoinder to Blankenburg, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 291 (1984).
120. For a refreshing deconstruction, see Rena Steinzor, The Truth About Regulation in America, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 323 (2011).
121. Deakin, supra note 118, at 1.
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of coordination strategies within its own reference system, nor that this
would work the other way around. Law and economics, as an engagement between both systems, is too often presented as being able to draw
on shared concerns about efficiency, costs, externalities, or of course,
rights.122 Surely, however, each means different things to this or that system.123
As a result, contract governance offers a welcome opportunity to
reach out but also to reach back. This is not novel for lawyers, who are
known to be constantly laboring on models of law that are developed in
response to what has been perceived as a heightened complexity of society. While this endeavour of formulating legal responses to societal
problems is too often understood as one that lies within the competence
area of public lawyers, contract lawyers have continued to claim that
their field cannot be understood in separation from an encompassing understanding and theorizing of social complexity.124 The emerging research field of contract governance promises to shed some new light125
on the interaction and overlap between contractual and organizational
governance dynamics by exploring the governance function of contract
and corporate law as parallel regulatory paradigms, tightly interwoven in
the face of highly volatile markets.126
Contract and corporate law need to be understood as being adequately “open” to allow for taking on board the specific contextual particularities that characterize contract governance. The need is particularly
acute when the function of contract governance consists of dealing with
complexity, as with various forms of risk. The focus on risks that need to
be managed by corporate managers—rather than the common interest in
conceptualizing management’s or the corporation’s “responsibility”—is
of crucial importance in a new assessment of what we should actually
understand as directors’ responsibilities, on the one hand, and the availability of defenses on the other. But in light of an evolving jurisprudence
on business judgment and entire fairness, what would this mean concretely? One way of going forward would be to use the framework and
122. “But it has to be remembered that the immediate question faced by the courts is not what
shall be done and by whom but who has the legal right to do what.” Ronald H. Coase, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960).
123. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal
Studies, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY, supra note 43, at 466–67; Kennedy, supra note 114.
124. See, e.g., John P. Esser, Institutionalizing Industry: The Changing Forms for Contract, in
LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY 593 (1996); Campbell, supra note 115.
125. See here in particular the contributions to CONTRACT AND ORGANISATION, supra note 20.
126. Florian Möslein, Contract Governance und Corporate Governance im Zusammenspiel –
Lehren aus der globalen Finanzkrise [Contract Governance and Corporate Governance in Interaction: Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis], 65 JURISTENZEITUNG (JZ) [LAWYERS’ JOURNAL]
72, 78 (2010).

1490

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 35:1469

concept of contract governance to reach beyond the oppositional poles
that characterize principal-agent relations within the corporation. Whereas contract thinking within the corporation is too often pitted against allegedly undue state intervention, a more differentiated model of contract
governance would allow us to take the analysis to the next level. For
such a model, it is necessary to return briefly to the well-known tension
between classical and relational contracts.
B. Beyond Public versus Private: The Promise of Relational Contract
Theory for a New Theory of the Firm
Relational contracting depicts complex contractual arrangements
over time in order to allow for a more adequate description of the combination of contract, bargain, organization, amendment, and adaptation that
characterize numerous contractual business relations today.127 Far from
depicting anything “cosy” or “familial” in those relations,128 relational
contract theory was primarily interested in developing a more adequate
rendering of the existing contractual governance practice in multi-polar,
time-extended business settings.
The need for providing context for the assumptions and arguments
of relational contract theory and social norms theory exists because of
the apparent proximity of the two theories. Relational contracting exists
in private market contexts and in public-private regulatory and collaboration contexts; it is the transformation of the surrounding regulatory landscape toward further decentralization and proceduralization that prompts
a renewed interest in exploring the “public dimension” of such contractual arrangements.129 The qualification of a contract as “public” in infrastructure maintenance or service delivery, which was formerly governed
and carried out under the auspices of the state, is less contentious than a
depiction of long-term contractual arrangements with built-in or associated amendment and adaptation capabilities as public. It is more contentious because of the difference in context and the consequences of attributing “public” qualities to a contractual arrangement commonly perceived as being of a private nature. The corporation springs to mind as
the definitive example—at least from the mainstream perspective. To
qualify contractual relations inside or outside of the corporation as public
127. See Macneil, supra notes 85 & 86.
128. But see Gunther Teubner, Contracting Worlds: The Many Autonomies of Private Law, 9
SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 399–417 (2000), and the response by Ian R. Macneil, Contracting Worlds and
Essential Contract Theory, 9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 431 (2000).
129. See, e.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., An Administrative Law Perspective on Government Social
Service Contracts: Outsourcing Prison Health Care in New York City, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 301 (2007).
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and to base such a qualification on assertions of particular dimensions of
responsibility or accountability short-circuits the attempt to unpack the
concept of relational contract within the corporation by reformulating the
nature of the firm through a comprehensive theory of corporate social
responsibility.
Does this thought experiment already spell the end for the attempt
to bring relational contract thinking into the ambit of the corporation? Is
this equal to the touching of the third rail? A possible solution might be
found if we returned to the initial impetus that led us to undertake a parallel study of contract governance and corporate governance. A driving
idea at the basis of this project is the concern with the conceptual shortcomings of the dominant “theories of the firm.” Referenced as either
shareholder or stakeholder theories respectively, we regularly find the
construction of two diametrically opposed explanatory frameworks, neither of which is sufficiently sophisticated to provide a satisfying answer
to most of the conflicts arising inside and outside of a corporation. We
find an under-theorized concept of contract governance, a concept that
basically operates with the most rudimentary assertion of contractual
bargaining. Conversely, we find assertions of an organization, holistic in
nature, implausibly overburdened with just about any social, political, or
public concern one would wish to place on the shoulders of the next best
“powerful company.”
The lesson to be learned from relational contracting is in fact within
reach. Rather than merely pitting long-term contracting and adaptation
arrangements against one-off exchange contracts, it would seem much
more promising to return to the idea of relational contracting from a
methodological perspective. This means that relational contracting is to
be understood as a governance framework (albeit with loopholes and
reasons for contestation)130 for complex interactional arrangements, but
at the same time, relational contracting, perhaps better than canonical
corporate law doctrine, allows us to incorporate contextual evidence into
our governance of the contracts at issue. The example of fiduciary duties
illustrates this point. When we (used to) force reified conceptions of the
purpose of the corporation into the demarcations of a duty of loyalty,131
the only viable response is a choice between regulation and deference to

130. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L.
REV. 847 (2000); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design,
115 YALE L.J. 814 (2006).
131. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 117, at 90–108. But see BERLE, supra
note 11, at 61–115; FREUND, supra note 19, at 35–36 (emphasizing the intertwined public and private natures of the business associations and the related problems of theorizing the firm’s responsibility and the subsequent sections).
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business judgment.132 When, however, we stress the idea of the corporation as a web of interlocking and overlapping contracts beyond the basic
assertion of a “nexus of contracts,” it becomes possible to perceive of the
now more fully visible contractual arrangements throughout and beyond
the corporation as representations of a highly differentiated governance
network.
The difference between this contractual-network concept and the
otherwise dominant, if still slightly incoherent model of the contractual
corporation,133 is that this conception forces us to more adequately consider the context in which the contractual arrangement is situated. This
context is characterized by a deep and fundamental transformation of
public accountability and sovereign stature regarding the creation, delivery, and maintenance of services that are widely perceived as pertaining
to the common good; in other words, the large-scale transformation, if
not the erosion, of the (Western) welfare state.134 This has important consequences for our engagement with the corporation as a target and site of
regulatory governance. As it becomes increasingly difficult to offset the
allegedly private nature of the corporation against the “public” nature of
regulation and intervention, an implied understanding of allegedly public
or private dimensions of the contracts entered into by different parties
inside and outside of the corporation cannot govern the opposition of
different interests within the corporation. Instead, a different set of categorizations must ensue, which must guide the interpretation of contractual rights. While there is not sufficient space here to elaborate this more
fully,135 the broader scope of such categories can already be sketched.
The crucial element in the recontractualization of the corporation
lies in the new understanding of the contractual relations between different “stakeholders” in and around the corporation. From the proposed perspective, contracts cannot simply be understood as instantiations of rights
and duties creating relations between different stakeholders. Instead, the
perspective moves away from an individualistic perception of the endpoints of the contractual relations toward a more systematic understanding. Whereas now, the endpoints of all contracts within the corporation
are identifiable with particular positions, carriers of interests, and different degrees of power, an alternative understanding would insist on expanding the scope of this identification so that the context of the as132. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
133. See William W. Bratton, Welfare, Dialectic, and Mediation in Corporate Law, 2
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 59 (2005).
134. See THE NEW POLITICS OF THE WELFARE STATE (Paul Pierson ed., 2001).
135. For earlier considerations, see Peer Zumbansen, The New Embeddedness of the Corporation: Corporate Social Responsibility in the Knowledge Society, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM, supra note
17, at 119.
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sumed, defended, and mobilized bargaining positions can be considered.
This would lead to an enriched understanding of the different contracting
parties. The enrichment would go not only significantly beyond diametrical opposition between owners and managers but also beyond that between investors and employees. If the identification of a contract’s endpoint allowed for an illumination of the larger context and framework
within which someone entered into and assumed a particular contracting
position, it would become possible to take the contract’s, and with that
the corporation’s, context and environment into consideration. The expanded consideration can then be incorporated in identifying who is at
the respective ends of contractual relations within the corporation.
C. The Many Bases of Contracts136
One could argue that this might result in a similar overburdening of
contractual relations that already characterized the theoretical policy proposals put forward by first and second generation consumer protection
law scholars.137 The difference between both approaches, however, is
already the different “moment in time.” Today’s attempts to develop a
protective framework of consumer rights can build on a far more
acknowledged policy framework supporting its underlying cause,138 but
consumer law advocates now operate in a far more decentralized and
volatile institutional and normative environment.139 This constellation
suggests some structural similarity between the conditions of private
contracting in the area of consumer goods, as well as (formerly public)
services and provisions on a global scale and intra-corporate contracting.
The interests represented by those at the endpoints of the respective contracts are different today than they used to be. With a fundamental shift
in the public and private provision of basic needs security, social insurance, and old age security guarantees, the association of contracts with
the “market” or the “state” in order to delineate scope and extension of
rights and responsibilities is no longer an option. Seeing relations within
the corporation through a contractual lens allows for a better appreciation
of the context out of which a contract arose.
This empowerment, however, is not only associated with traditionally weak parties in the corporate governance regime such as employees,
136. Reverential apologies to Morris R. Cohen, supra note 102.
137. For a differentiated treatment, see Iain Ramsay, Consumer Law and the Search for Empowerment, 19 CAN. BUS. L.J. 397 (1991).
138. See, e.g., Geraint Howells & Thomas Wilhelmsson, EC Consumer Law: Has it Come of
Age?, 28 EUR. L. REV. 370 (2003).
139. See Daniela Caruso, Private Law and State-Making in the Age of Globalization, 39
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1 (2006); Ugo Mattei & Fernanda Nicola, A “Social Dimension” in European Private Law? The Call for Setting a Progressive Agenda, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (2006).
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creditors, the environment, and society at large, but instead, this empowerment is also felt at all endpoints of the contractual-network structure.
Directors would hereby be given a far greater opportunity to have their
position within the firm recognized and scrutinized well beyond the routine assertions of a director discharging the duty of loyalty.
There are two reasons, then, why we should not so directly embrace
the idea of empowerment. The first reason follows from an appreciation
of the fallacies of romanticizing private relations without taking into account the power relations that inform and shape the levels of freedom
available to the different participants in a private regulatory regime.140
While consumer protection law went some way in indicating regulatory
responses to the problems of bargaining asymmetry, we now find ourselves often confronted with a much more complex, multi-polar contractual setting, which is not as easily amenable to a “weak” versus “strong”
party assessment as would perhaps have been the case in differently
structured contractual arrangements. Second, comparison with earlier
forms of consumer law is inappropriate because of the altered regulatory
landscape. Whereas before the law around consumer contracts had to
keep an eye on both national and (some) international legislation, as well
as case law, today’s consumer law is an extremely fluid mixed body of
norms. Some of these norms emerged from traditional state-based
sources, while others do not stem from traditional lawmakers. They both
emerge from and contribute to the evolution of a volatile, transnational
regulatory regime.141 The same can be said for corporate law, which has
long been a fundamentally transnational regulatory field; the hybrid nature of actors, norms, and processes makes corporate law a very promising area for legal-sociological and legal-pluralist analysis.
Consumer protection law has illustrated the political dimensions of
negotiating the adequate relationship between private autonomy and state
intervention just as powerfully as the debate around the convergence or
divergence of corporate governance models. Against this background,
politics still very clearly matter in the continuously unfolding research
agenda around contract and corporate governance, but the term “politics”
on its own hardly contributes to a further refinement of the fields as pertinent governance fields. What is “political” about contract governance,
just as it is about corporate governance or about the regulation of labor
markets, is anything but an identifiable selection of different interests or
even stakeholders. The fallacy of methodological individualism turns out
to trigger highly undesirable consequences, as it falls dramatically short
140. See Charny, supra note 110.
141. See CALLIESS & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 94, at ch. 3; Gralf-Peter Calliess, The Making of
Transnational Contract Law, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 469 (2007).
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of capturing the complexity that ties contracts, corporations, and labor
markets together. To study this complex landscape, we must develop a
methodology that appreciates the fundamental differences in systems’
description and construction of the world in order to imagine a nonunifying, pluralist approach to making sense of governance, regulation,
and of the “and” in law and economics.
It follows that an enhanced interdisciplinary study of the noncontractual “foundations” of contracting cannot stop at the sociological
analysis of how and between whom promises are made and how they are
implemented, enforced, and institutionalized. As we have seen, we must
take into account as relevant the individual and collective disposition of
market actors and the larger patterns and mechanisms of information
transmission, such as those that lead to changes in stock markets.142 The
cautionary tale here, particularly for the legal and economic scholars who
have recently begun to embrace “social norms” and institutional economics as the foundation of a social theory of regulation, is that to focus on
just this side of market behavior might too easily provide a platform for a
one-sided and de-contextual focus on “what people do.” One risk with
such a behavioral analysis, disembedded from the larger societal context
in which human behavior occurs, is that we cut the ties between
longstanding sociological research into societal change and our present
interest in contracts as prime modes of governance. Further, we risk severely underestimating the nature of the norms we are referring to under
the umbrella of “social norms.”
Building on legal sociology and legal pluralism on the one hand,
and on new institutional economics on the other, will go some way toward a more differentiated understanding of norms in the evolving complex regulatory landscape that characterizes the interaction of public,
private, state-originating, and non-state informal norms today. But even
that approach would have to more seriously consider different alternative
types and shapes of norms: cultural, symbolic, or in other ways nonlegal. A more suitable methodological approach would attempt to see
beyond and between individual motivations, beliefs, or rationales that
drive behavior in order to overcome the focus either on market versus
non-market spheres or the breaking up of a complex environment into
different interests.
To reiterate the context in which our current investigations are embedded, if complexity is one (if not the crucial) determinative challenge
142. See, e.g., GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN
PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2009)
(harking back, of course, to John Maynard Keynes’s chapter 12 in THE GENERAL THEORY OF
EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 147, 161 (1965)).
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facing any attempt at formulating regulatory responses to situations of
crisis (such as those sought in response to the current financial crisis, but
not limited to this moment in time), then it is important to acknowledge
the core trait of complexity and recognize that it cannot be broken down
into or explained through its constituent parts.143 Rather than trying to
devise a meta-code oriented around a particular central or dominating
goal or value, regulation will have to take into account the need to devise
a process that appreciates the different functional rationalities at work
within a particular regulatory problem. Such an approach would include
a fundamental shift from normative to cognitive expectations in the
structure and the understanding of regulatory processes.144 While this
approach was made with particular reference to the challenges facing
legal theory in the context of a fragmented global legal order,145 it forcefully applies to the current conundrum of financial regulation as much as
it does to the fields of contract governance146 and corporate governance.
The latter areas constitute formidable examples of complex regulatory
arenas in that they each defy categorizations along traditional forms of
political versus non-political, state versus non-state, and public versus
private regulation.
Both areas are public and private at the same time—and more. In
addition, they are neither national nor international, neither formal nor
informal. Our distinctions can go only so far in illuminating the component structure of financial regulation or contract governance. The exhaustion of these distinctions illustrates the inadequacy of trying to associate
governance processes with structures of either “regulation” or “selfregulation.” This association would make sense only if the boundaries
demarcated self-standing structures of norm generation and implementation. That is not the case; we base our distinction in the end on the appreciation of a particular level of deference or “autonomy.” In the case of
regulation, this ordinarily depicts the state as having the choice to intervene or not to intervene. By contrast, “self-regulation” depicts actors—
individual or institutional—as exercising norm-generating authority on
an autonomous basis, that is, free from regulation as intervention. The

143. See Deakin, supra note 118, at 11.
144. For more background, see Marc Amstutz, Globalising Speenhamland: On the Transnational Metamorphosis of Corporate Social Responsibility, in KARL POLANYI, GLOBALISATION, AND
THE POTENTIAL OF LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL MARKETS 359, 373–74 (Christian Joerges & Josef
Falke eds., 2011).
145. See id.; see also Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World
Society, GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1996).
146. See Amstutz, supra note 144; Teubner, supra note 145.
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fragmentary nature of this depiction is not new,147 but beyond the clarification of the rights basis of the exercise of authority, there is the problem
of over-individualizing who in fact is regulating or self-regulating. The
current attempts to push regulatory theory toward a framework that can
incorporate systemic linkages148 underline the importance to move beyond “interests” and “stakeholders”149 to a more differentiated system of
“affectedness.”150 This move represents one of the keys to thinking about
regulation and governance.
The correlation between an interest in “affectedness” among constitutionalists and democracy theorists cannot render us blind to the “use of
knowledge in society.” As forcefully demarcated by Friedrich Hayek, the
analytical emphasis has to be on the adequate locus and the level of
(self-) regulation. 151 This connection between grass-roots perspectives on
political legitimacy and the economists’ interest in identifying the best
level of rule generation is important, as it allows a more encompassing
appreciation of the regulatory challenges arising in a landscape that displays increasingly prominent elements of deterritorialized, decentralized,
and nontraditional forms of legislation.152 Because an economic assessment of the merits of decentralization, as well as regulatory competition
over harmonization,153 cannot drill deeply enough into issues of represen147. See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38
POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923); Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927).
148. See Marc Amstutz, Eroding Boundaries: On Financial Crisis and an Evolutionary Concept of Regulatory Reform, in THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE: THE DARK
SIDE OF FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION 223 (Poul F. Kjaer et al. eds., 2011).
149. See also Peer Zumbansen & Simon Archer, The BCE Decision: Reflections on the Firm as
a Contractual Organization (CLPE Research Paper No. 17/2008 2008), available at http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1160094.
150. See the important work by Cotterrell, supra note 95, and David Held, Democratic Accountability and Political Effectiveness from a Cosmopolitan Perspective, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION
364 (2004). The theme of “affectedness” is certainly a key notion in constitutionalism studies. See,
e.g., JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY
(1995).
151. “[D]ecisions must be left to the people who are familiar with those circumstances, who
know directly of the relevant changes and and of the resources immediately available to them.”
Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 524 (1945); see also
ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009) (applying such thinking in legal
rule-making); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).
152. See TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF
REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2011); Larry Catá Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State: The Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board, and the
Global Governance Order, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 751 (2011).
153. See Konstantine G. Gatsios & Peter H. Holmes, Regulatory Competition, in THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY, supra note 43, at 271. But see Paul B. Stephan, Regulatory Cooperation
and Competition: The Search for Virtue, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: LEGAL
PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS 167 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000); Jonathan R.
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tation and legitimacy, it is crucial to take noneconomic considerations
into view that approach the issue through the lens of pluralism and norm
theory.154
VI. CONCLUSION
So, what lessons are we able to draw at this point? The “awesome
social invention”155 of the large publicly held corporation continues to be
a focal point of intensive analysis. The study of the corporation necessitates a reflection on the methods and theories with which we approach
this undertaking. The reflection on corporate governance, contract governance, and the interdisciplinary nature of corporate law is an important
prerequisite for an enhanced understanding of the nature of the corporation.
But the continuing investigations into the “nature” of the corporation show that contractual and organizational models of the corporation
still inform our thinking about a theory of the firm. The same is true for
attempts to carve out the definitive private or public nature of the firm.
Such attempts say more about the concurring efforts in making sense of a
globalizing, complex society, a society that in the West has been described for some time through the demarcations of public and private
spaces, referring to the state on one hand, and to the market on the other.
The treacherous nature of such distinctions is well known by now and
rejected by hardly anyone. What is at stake around the endless rounds of
contestation and resurrection of these distinctions is what really matters.
Contracts have been crucial instruments and fora of societal governance for a long time. But that has never meant, nor should it today,
that they can be studied in isolation from the context in which they perform regulatory functions. Parties do not simply enter into agreements
outside or “in the shadow of the law” because they deem it efficient. The
“turn to contract” occurs in the context of a richly structured field of public and private intersecting modes of governance. To celebrate either
contract or social norms as the (late) expressions of economic liberalism
will give little guidance to the questions we face today. Economic governance must correctly be understood as a call to arms—not against the
alleged interventionist fervor of zealous governments or activist judges,
but rather for the building of a comprehensive, interdisciplinary theory of
(market) governance today.
Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory Competition, 52 EMORY L.J. 1353
(2003).
154. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 80; and Sally Engle Merry, Anthropology, Law, and Transnational Processes, 21 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 357 (1992).
155. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 357.

